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Game Theoretical Semantics for Some
Non-Classical Logics
Can Bas¸kent
Abstract
Paraconsistent logics are the formal systems in which absurduties do
not trivialize the logic. In this paper, we give Hintikka-style game theoret-
ical semantics for a variety of paraconsistent and non-classical logics. For
this purpose, we consider Priest’s Logic of Paradox, Dunn’s First-Degree En-
tailment, Routleys’ Relevant Logics, McCall’s Connexive Logic and Belnap’s
Four-Valued Logic. We also present a game theoretical characterization of
a translation between Logic of Paradox/Kleene’s K3 and S5. We underline
how non-classical logics require different verification games and prove the
correctness theorems of their respective game theoretical semantics. This
allows us to observe that paraconsistent logics break the classical bidirec-
tional connection between winning strategies and truth values.
Keywords Game Theoretical Semantics; Logic of Paradox; First-Degree
Entailment; Relevant Logic; Connexive Logic; Belnap’s Four Valued Logic
B4; Modal Logic S5.
1 Introduction
Game theoretical semantics suggests a very intuitive and natural approach to
formal semantics and proofs. The semantic verification game for classical logic
is played by two players, the verifier and the falsifier, who we call Heloise and
Abelard respectively. The verifier’s goal is to verify the truth of a given formula
in a given model. Dually, the falsifier’s goal is to falsify it. The rules of the
semantic verification game are specified syntactically based on the form of the
formula. During the play of the game, the given formula is broken into sub-
formulas step by step by the players. The play of the game terminates when
it reaches the propositional literals and when there is no move to make. If the
play ends with a propositional literal which is true in the model in question,
then the verifier wins the game. Otherwise, the falsifier wins. We associate
conjunction with the falsifier, disjunction with the verifier. That is, when the
main connective is a conjunction, it is the falsifier’s turn to choose and make
a move, and similarly, disjunction yields a choice for the verifier. The negation
operator switches the roles of the players: the verifier becomes the falsifier and
the falsifier becomes the verifier. Informally, a player is said to have a winning
strategy if he has a set of rules that guides him throughout the play and tells
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him which move to make, and consequently gives him a win regardless of how
the opponent plays. The major result of this approach states that Heloise the
verifier has a winning strategy in the verification game if and only if the given
formula is true in the given model. This is called the correctness theorem for
game theoretical semantics for classical logic.
There can be found various foundational philosophical problems in game
semantics. First, the verifier cannot be expected to verify a formula in a single
play if she does not have a winning strategy. But the very existence of a win-
ning strategy requires quantification over plays1. Second, a determined perfect
information game such as a semantic verification game may be found irrational
to play for the losing player. The reason is simple: computational complexity
of verifying the truth of a formula (that is computing it from the truth table, in
the classical propositional case) is very low. Then, it is reasonable to ask why a
rational player would engage in such a simple determined perfect information
game if she does not have a winning strategy? However important they are,
such philosophical issues fall outside the scope of this work.
This paper is motivated by the fact that the semantic verification game and
its rules are shaped by classical logic and consequently by its restrictions. Our
goal is to observe how verification games change in some well-known proposi-
tional non-classical and paraconsistent logics when we strictly follow the Hin-
tikkan methodology. In what follows, we obtain semantic verification games
in which winning strategies for players are not sufficient conditions for estab-
lishing the truth values of the formulas, and observe further how the Hintikkan
agenda may or may not be carried over to non-classical logics successfully.
A warning is in order here. Notice that in verification games players may
change their roles throughout the game depending on the occurrences of the
negation symbol2. Therefore, players’ roles at the beginning of the game and
at the end of the game may differ. Abelard may start the game as the falsifier
but end up being the verifier. For this reason, the characterization theorems for
game semantics and logics are given based on players’ roles. This is easy when
the game has two players with two immediate roles, such as the verifier and the
falsifier. But, for multi-valued logics and non-classical logics, it is not easy to
identify and name the precise roles of the players. Therefore, throughout the
paper, we give the characterization theorems for players’ roles and informally
associate it with the players for clarity.
1We are grateful to one of the anonymous referees for pointing this out.
2A quick solution to this problem is to convert the given formula to its negation normal form with
all the occurrences of negation symbols in front of the formula. This allows to distribute the roles at
the very beginning of the play and prevents any further role redistribution during the play. However,
for the most general case, we do not resort to this trick. Additionally, for many non-classical logics,
failure of the De Morgan laws makes it difficult, if not impossible, to form the negation normal
forms.
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1.1 Non-Classical Logics and Game Theoretical Semantics: A
Brief Overview
Game theoretical semantics (GTS, for short) was popularized by Jaakko Hin-
tikka and Helsinki School researchers, even though similar ideas can be found
in Parikh (much later published as (Parikh, 1999)).
Game semantics nowadays spans a very broad field attracting computer sci-
entists and philosophers alike. Some extensive surveys of the subject can be
found in (Abramsky & McCusker, 1999; Pietarinen & Sandu, 2000; Pietarinen,
2003; Hintikka & Sandu, 1997). An overview of the field and its relation to
various epistemic and scientific topics was discussed in (Pietarinen, 2003).
The connection between non-classical logics and game semantics still re-
mains understudied. A game theoretical reading of truth and its relation to win-
ning strategies were investigated by (Boyer & Sandu, 2012). Pietarinen consid-
ered various non-classical issues including partiality and non-competitive games
within the framework of GTS with some connections to the Kleene logic with-
out focusing on particular (paraconsistent) logics (Pietarinen, 2000; Pietari-
nen, 2004; Sandu & Pietarinen, 2001). Hintikka and Sandu discussed non-
classicality in GTS also without specifically offering any insight on paraconsis-
tency (Hintikka & Sandu, 1997; Pietarinen & Sandu, 2000). Tulenheimo stud-
ied languages with two negation signs, which can bear some resemblence to
paraconsistent ideas on weak and strong negations (Tulenheimo, 2014). Addi-
tionally, relating GTS to constructivism and intuitionism with some reference to
type-theoretical foundations was presented by Ranta (Ranta, 1988). An epis-
temic, first-order extension of GTS, called “Independence-Friendly” logic, was
suggested by Hintikka and Sandu (Hintikka & Sandu, 1989; Mann et al., 2011).
Independence-friendly logics can be viewed as the logics for imperfect informa-
tion games and they introduce Henkin quantifiers to game theoretical discus-
sions.
It is worth noting how intuitionism can be approached from a GTS point of
view. Hintikka remarked that the law of excluded middle may not hold in some
instances of GTS. The reason is that the lack of a winning strategy for a player
does not entail the existence of a winning strategy for the other player, which
suggests that some semantic games may not be zero-sum (Hintikka, 1996).
However, Hintikka himself was never very clear on GTS and intuitionism, es-
pecially when it came to negation (Tennant, 1998).
In this work, we consider a variety of well-known non-classical and para-
consistent logics. We define paraconsistent logic as any formal system that does
not satisfy the explosion principle: ϕ,¬ϕ ` ψ for all ϕ,ψ. In other words, in
paraconsistent logic, inconsistencies do not trivialize the system. There exists
a wide variety of paraconsistent logics, and there are numerous ways to con-
struct them (da Costa et al., 2007; Priest, 2002; Priest, 2007). Apart from its
proof-theoretical definition, paraconsistency can also be described semantically
suggesting that in paraconsistent logics some formulas and their negations can
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both be true3. In what follows, we will trace the reflections of this semantical
condition on verification games, and ask how verification games might change
when the logic allows non-trivial inconsistencies.
Apart from studying the underlying logic, GTS can also be approached from
a purely game theoretical perspective. In the classical case, the verification
games are constructed as zero-sum (a win for a player is a loss for the other),
two-player, determined (one player always has a winning strategy), sequential
(players do not make moves at the same time) non-cooperative games. It is
then worthwhile to consider verification games where i) Abelard and Heloise
both may win, ii) Abelard and Heloise both may lose, iii) Heloise may win,
Abelard may not lose, iv) Abelard may win, Heloise may not lose, v) There is a
tie, vi) There is an additional player, vii) Players play simultaneously, and viii)
Players may cooperate. Such different possibilities can occur, for instance, when
both p and ¬p are true, so that both players can be expected to have winning
strategies. We can also imagine verification games with additional truth values
and additional players beyond verifiers and falsifiers, and also construct games
where players may play concurrently in a parallel fashion.
Additionally, in the classical case, the existence of winning strategies and
the truth values of formulas are closely connected. In particular, can players
have winning strategies that cannot determine the truth value of the formula?
Can the truth value of a formula be established if more than one player has a
winning strategy? In what follows, we observe such deviances from the classical
case.
Another motivation to approach GTS from a non-classical logical perspec-
tive is game compositionality. Combining logics using various game theoretical,
semantical and model theoretical arguments is central in proof theory (Abram-
sky, 2007; Gabbay et al., 2003). However, such work has not been extended to
paraconsistent logics to the best of our knowledge. In this regard, constructing
a theory for composing semantic games for different non-classical logics is still
an open problem, and this work attempts to take a modest step towards that
direction.
1.2 Negation: Game Theoretical Motivation
The problems of negation constitute one of the main motivations in the de-
velopment of various non-classical logics. For our purposes, negation becomes
problematic especially when it is considered within a game theoretical context.
In the classical case, as we mentioned, the negation operator forces players to
assume their opponent’s role. Yet, in the non-classical case, it is not obvious
how the new roles are determined. The following simple example illustrates
our point.
3Paraconsistency is usually given a proof-theoretical definition, as we did. Semantical (and
metaphysical) commitment for the possibility of having true contradictions is called dialetheism.
In this work, to prevent an inflation of terminology, we use the term “paraconsistency” both in
proof-theoretical and semantical senses.
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Example 1.1. Two men want to marry a princess. The king says they have to race
on a horseback. The slowest one wins, and can marry the princess. How can one
win this game and marry the princess?
The solution simply suggests that the men need to swap their horses. Since
the fastest one loses, and players race with each other’s horse, what they need
to do is to become the fastest in the dual game. The fastest one on the switched
horse in the dual game wins the original game.
In the above example, it becomes clear how GTS for negation operates. If
the slowest one wins the game G, then the fastest one wins the dual game Gd.
There is certainly some sense of rationality here. That is, the players consider it
easier in some sense to switch horses and race in the dual game. Yet, the above
example and the idea are not strong enough to generalize. One of the most
obvious difficulties arises when the same game is considered with 3 or more
players. For n > 2 players, the solution requires a different understanding of
negation. The similar complexity also carries over to binary connectives per-
ceived as choice functions for certain players (Olde Loohuis & Venema, 2010).
For example, let us consider Example 1.1 with three players. If three play-
ers are supposed to switch horses for the dual game, it is possible that some
players may end up with their own horses. The players who end up with their
own horses can be viewed as the fixed-points for negation. Therefore, in some
games, negation may not change the roles of some players and this needs to be
addressed in verification games.
*
This paper aims at filling the gap in the literature between game theoretical
semantics and paraconsistent non-classical logics. In what follows, we consider
a variety of well-known paraconsistent logics, offer Hintikkan game semantics
for them and observe how different logics generate different verification games.
By this, we remark how the Hintikkan methodology applies to non-classical log-
ics when the verification games and the players’ roles are defined in the stan-
dard way. This project is philosophically important when winning strategies
are seen as constructive proofs for truth in an intuitionistic sense or as verifica-
tions (Boyer & Sandu, 2012). Therefore, by focusing on inconsistent formulas
and associated winning strategies, we offer alternative (constructive) proofs
for inconsistencies and contribute to the computational discussions on the con-
nection between proofs, strategies and truth. Furthermore, game semantics is
a non-compositional semantics, where the truth value of a formula does not
necessarily depend on the truth value of all its subformulas. Therefore, by con-
structing semantics games, this work suggests non-compositional semantics for
various non-classical logics.
In this work, we consider Priest’s Logic of Paradox, Dunn’s First-Degree En-
tailment, Routleys’ Relevant Logic, McColl’s Connexive Logic, Belnap’s Four Val-
ued Logic and modal S5 and discuss their game semantics. En passant, we
briefly discuss the Brazilian and Canadian schools of paraconsistency.
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2 Semantic Games
As we argued earlier, semantic verification games for non-classical logics do not
necessarily have the limitations of semantic games for classical logic which are
two-player, zero-sum, non-cooperative, sequential and determined. For that
reason, we define semantic games broadly to allocate the deviances of non-
classical logics within game theoretical framework.
Let us now formally define GTS following the terminology given in (Pietari-
nen & Sandu, 2000). First, we take the language L of propositional logic with
the following syntax for a set of countable propositional variables P:
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ
where p ∈ P. The non-classical logics we consider here may or may not enjoy
the De Morgan Laws for the interdefinability of the connectives. This, however,
will not be our main concern here. In this respect, the above syntax includes
the connectives that we believe are central in our non-classical inquiry of game
semantics, and for simplicity, we assume that L has neither→ nor↔. Through-
out the paper, except when we consider modal S5, we assume the standard
language L of propositional logic as defined above. Let us now define models.
Definition 2.1. A model M is a tuple (S, v) where S is a non-empty domain on
which the game is played, and the valuation function v assigns the formulas in
L to truth values in the logic.
In order to define a verification game in a model, we need some game the-
oretical components. First, we need a set of players with the supposition that
each player forces a truth value. This defines players’ goals, that is, they try to
reach an atom that has the truth value that they are forcing. However, their
roles can be changed in the play by the negation operator: a player may start
the play with a specific role and end up with some other role. Second, we need
rules telling each player what moves are possible at each stage depending on
their roles. Sometimes, some players may make simultaneous moves, some-
times, some players may make no move at all. Since moves are made between
game positions, we need to define them as well. A game-token can be used to
indicate the current position of the players. Finally, it is possible to have con-
current or parallel play, and this needs to be specified. An inclusive definition
of a verification game is given as follows.
Definition 2.2. A verification game is a tuple Γ = (pi, ρ, σ, τ, δ) where pi is the set
of players aiming at winning the play by reaching atomic formulas with specific
truth values based on their roles, ρ is the set of well-defined game rules, σ is
the set of positions, τ is the set of positions of the game-token in the case of a
concurrent play, and δ is the set of designated truth values.
A more detailed explanation for the components of Γ is in order. The set of
positions or game states σ is determined by the subformulas of the given for-
mula and the players. We also embed the turn function at the positions into
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game rules for simplicity. Therefore, the set of positions will be composed of tu-
ples as (pi, ϕ) for pi ∈ pi and a well defined formula ϕ. The tuple (pi, ϕ) will read
“it is player pi’s turn at ϕ”. The set σpi will denote the set of positions for player
pi ∈ pi, and will be defined as σpi = {(pi, ϕ) : (pi, ϕ) ∈ σ for a fixed player pi}.
The set σ is not sufficient by itself to describe concurrency in verification
games as we also need to know which positions are tied together and played si-
multaneously. In the classical case, τ is the set of singletons of the form {(pi, ϕ)}
for pi ∈ pi and a well-defined formula ϕ as there is no parallel play. However,
in non-classical verification games, as we may need to resort to concurrency,
τ need not be composed of singletons. Therefore, {(p1, ϕ), (p2, ψ)} ∈ τ will
then read that “player p1 plays ϕ and player p2 plays ψ concurrently (simulta-
neously)”. For simplicity, we will not include the end-points (that is, the atoms)
in τ . Additionally, in the logics we consider, only the binary connectives have
the potential to create concurrency and parallel plays in the game. Therefore in
the play, the current place of the game token is determined by σ and τ together.
Moreover, the separation of σ and τ serves another purpose that the verification
games in non-classical logics are not assumed to be zero-sum. Thus, the out-
come of one subgame does not necessarily determine the outcome of its parallel
play, if it exists.
Given two positions (pi, ϕ) and (pj , ψ) for i 6= j ∈ pi, we say that they are
played concurrently (or in parallel) if ∃X ∈ τ such that X = {(pi, ϕ), (pj , ψ)}.
The definition can easily be extended to n-concurrency where n different players
are allowed to play concurrently. Throughout this work, we will use “concur-
rency” and “parallel play” interchangeably for easy reading.
It is important to see that this reading of concurrency in games entails that
concurrent moves result in two separate positions. This separation is essential
as it does not presuppose any additional game theoretical restrictions and keeps
the model simple. Clearly, it is possible to define game theoretical concurrency
for different purposes, yet we stick to our definition for simplicity.
The set of game rules ρ will be defined inductively as transformations from
a game position (pi, ϕ) to a set of game positions {(pj , ψ)}j∈I for pi ∈ pi, I ⊆ pi,
well-defined formula ϕ and a subformula ψ of ϕ, defined in the standard way.
For a rule r ∈ ρ and a set of positions O, the set r(O) denotes the set of posi-
tions obtained from applying r to the set of positions in O (where applicable).
When specifying the set ρ for the logics we discuss here, we will use the infor-
mal descriptions of the rules for simplicity. It will also help us to maintain the
Hintikkan intuition about game semantics.
Finally, the set of designated truth values are used to define theorems in a
given particular logic. They can be viewed as a non-classical extension of the
truth value TRUE, and are preserved under valid inferences. For example, two
logics may enjoy the same truth table but can be distinguished by a different set
of designated truth values.
Game semantics naturally introduces game theoretical concepts to logic. In
this respect, a strategy for a player is a set of rules that tells him which move to
make at each position where it is his turn. A winning strategy is a strategy that
guarantees a win for the player regardless of the moves of the opponents.
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The play of a verification game terminates when it reaches atomic formulas,
and the winner is determined by the truth value of the atom. In the classical
case for example, if we end up with an atom with a truth value T , the verifier
wins the game4.
In the non-classical case, the existence of a winning strategy for a player
does not necessarily entail the non-existence of winning strategies for the oppo-
nents. Moreover, some players may force some truth values jointly (by forming
coalitions, for example) or some players may force no truth values (which can
be called noneist players or nullifiers). In this work, we focus on the existence
of winning strategies and how this relates to the truth value of the formula in
question. For this reason, strategies (or winning strategies) themselves are not
the main focus of this work.
Formally, a strategy s(pi) for a player pi is a function from a set of positions
to the set of positions obtained by applying the particular rules in ρ. Formally,
we define spi : σpi 7→
⋃
r∈ρ r(σpi) where pi ∈ pi, σpi is the set of positions for
player pi, and r(σpi) is the set of positions for pi obtained after the application
of rule r ∈ ρ. Notice that r(σpi) is not necessarily a subset of σpi . Also, it
is important to observe that strategies are defined from a set of positions, not
from a set of game tokens. The reason is that when players play concurrently
each may have their own strategy independent from each other.
Finally, we denote the semantic verification game Γ for a model M and a
well-defined formula ϕ ∈ L by Γ(M,ϕ).
The framework we have presented so far has the expressive power for the se-
mantic games we consider in this work. But more importantly, it carries the Hin-
tikkan game theoretical intuition over to non-classical logical semantic games,
which is one of our main focal points in this work.
3 Game Semantics for Logic of Paradox
Logic of paradox (LP, for short) introduces an additional truth value P , called
paradoxical, which intuitively stands for both true and false (Priest, 1979).
The logics LP and Kleene’s three valued logic K3 have the same truth tables.
However, they differ on the truth values that they preserve in valid inferences,
and how they read P . The truth values that are preserved in validities are
called designated truth values and they can be thought of as the extensions of
the classical notion of truth (Priest, 2008). In LP, it is the set {T, P}; in K3
(and classical logic), it is the set {T}. Even if the truth tables of two logics
are the same, different sets of designated truth values produce different sets of
validities, thus different logics. For instance, p∨¬p is a theorem in LP, but not in
K3. In K3, the third truth value has an intuitionistic reading and can be viewed
as an undervaluation in contrast to its reading as an overvaluation in LP. It is
also important to note that the set of validities of LP contains the set of validities
of the classical logic.
4Notice again that the initial and final configurations of the roles and the players may differ. For
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¬
T F
F T
P P
∧ T P F
T T P F
P P P F
F F F F
∨ T P F
T T T T
P T P P
F T P F
Figure 1: The truth tables for LP and K3.
We stipulate that the introduction of the third truth value requires an addi-
tional player that we call Astrolabe5. Astrolabe is the paradoxifier in the game
forcing the game to an end with the truth value P .
In GTS for LP, the first problem is to determine the turns and the moves
of three players at each connective. For instance, the problem surfaces clearly
when the formula t∧p, where t and p have the truth values T and P respectively,
is considered. In this quick game, if we assume that it is Abelard the falsifier’s
turn then he will not have a move that can give him a win. From the truth
table, it can be seen that the formula evaluates to P , therefore Astrolabe the
paradoxifier can be expected to have a winning strategy. In order to make it
possible, Astrolabe must be allowed to make moves at conjunctions. Similarly,
let us consider f ∨ p, where f and p have the truth values F and P respectively.
As it can be computed from the LP truth table, the formula f ∨ p has the truth
value P . Now, Heloise cannot make a move that can give her a win. Also,
Astrolabe needs to be given a turn to make a move to win. Therefore, we
associate disjunction with Heloise and Astrolabe, and conjunction with Abelard
and Astrolabe. This modification introduces parallel play where the players
may make moves in a parallel, concurrent fashion independently. In the case of
negation, Heloise and Abelard will switch their role, and Astrolabe will keep his
role as P is a fixed-point for negation in LP. Astrolabe’s role always remains as
the paradoxifier in the game.
The following example will be helpful in determining the rules for LP se-
mantic games. For simplicity and easiness in dealing with the non-classical
truth values, we will use the following convention: the proposition variable p
will have a truth value P , t will have T and f will have F and so on.
Example 3.1. Consider the formula (p∧ t)∨ (p∧ f) which evaluates to P in LP.
In this game, Astrolabe the paradoxifier has a winning strategy: at each end-
node (p ∧ t and p ∧ f), he selects p. Here, we also observe that Abelard being
stuck at some states (such as p∧t) does not necessarily entail a win for the other
players.
For this illustrative game, the game token set τ contains, for example, the
tuples {(Heloise, (p∧t)∨(p∧f)), (Astrolabe, (p∧t)∨(p∧f))} and {(Abelard, p∧
t), (Astrolabe, p ∧ t)} which read that players Heloise and Astrolabe play simul-
taneously at (p ∧ t) ∨ (p ∧ f), and players Abelard and Astrolabe play at p ∧ t
simultaneously, respectively.
instance, in some plays, Abelard may start as the falsifier yet may finish as the verifier.
5Astrolabe was the name of Abelard and Heloise’s son.
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(p ∧ t) ∨ (p ∧ f)
Heloise
p ∧ t
Abelard
p t
Astrolabe
p t
p ∧ f
Abelard
p f
Astrolabe
p f
Astrolabe
p ∧ t
Abelard
p t
Astrolabe
p t
p ∧ f
Abelard
p f
Astrolabe
p f
We denote the verification game for LP by GTSLP. GTSLP is a non-zero sum
verification game where more than one player may have a winning strategy.
Since GTSLP is non-zero sum, making the opponent lose does not necessarily
entail that it is a win for the player himself. As we will observe later on, in
GTSLP admitting winning strategies does not necessarily entail the truth value
of the formula in question.
Definition 3.2. The tuple ΓLP = (pi, ρ, σ, τ, δ) is a verification game for LP where
pi = {Astrolabe, Heloise, Abelard}, σ is the set of tuples (pi, ϕ) for pi ∈ pi and
a well-formed formula ϕ, and δ is {T, P}. For a game ΓLP(M,ϕ), τ is given
inductively for the positions (pi, ϕ) in σ as follows,
• if ϕ = ¬ψ, then,
– if {(Abelard,¬ψ)} ∈ τ then, {(Heloise, ψ)} ∈ τ ,
– if {(Heloise,¬ψ)} ∈ τ then, {(Abelard, ψ)} ∈ τ ,
– if {(Astrolabe,¬ψ)} ∈ τ then, {(Astrolabe, ψ)} ∈ τ ,
• if ϕ = χ ∧ ψ, then {(Abelard, χ ∧ ψ), (Astrolabe, χ ∧ ψ)} ∈ τ ,
• if ϕ = χ ∨ ψ, then {(Heloise, χ ∨ ψ), (Astrolabe, χ ∨ ψ)} ∈ τ ;
and, finally, ρ is given inductively as follows.
• If ϕ is atomic, the game terminates, and Heloise wins if ϕ is true, Abelard
wins if ϕ is false and Astrolabe wins if ϕ is paradoxical,
• if ϕ = ¬ψ, Abelard and Heloise switch roles, Astrolabe keeps his role, and
the game continues as ΓLP(M,ψ),
• if ϕ = χ ∧ ψ, Abelard and Astrolabe choose between χ and ψ simultane-
ously,
• if ϕ = χ ∨ ψ, Heloise and Astrolabe choose between χ and ψ simultane-
ously.
As we mentioned earlier, game rules ρ is given informally above. They can
be made more precise. For example, the last game rule for disjunction can
formally be written down as a function r as follows
r(pi, χ ∨ ψ) =
{
{(pj , χ), (pk, ψ)} if pi is Heloise,
{(pj , χ), (pk, ψ)} if pi is Astrolabe,
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where pi, pj , pk ∈ pi, {(Heloise, χ ∨ ψ), (Astrolabe, χ ∨ ψ)} ∈ τ , and game con-
tinues as either ΓLP(M,χ) or ΓLP(M,ψ) with whomever player is supposed to
make the next move. However, in order to reflect the game theoretical intuition
more clearly, from now on, we will specify the game rules as in Definition 3.2.
Additionally, in order to economize in the formal game definitions, from now
on we will define τ only for binary connectives as negation does not create a
parallel play.
As we have noted before, the correctness theorems are given with respect to
players’ roles. In order to avoid any possible confusion, we will put for example,
“Heloise the verifier” to specify that the theorem applies to the player who is the
verifier - even if it is not Heloise. This is for easy read, especially when we have
non-classical players with non-classical roles, such as paradoxifier.
Theorem 3.3. In a GTSLP verification game ΓLP(M,ϕ),
• Heloise the verifier has a winning strategy if ϕ is true in M ,
• Abelard the falsifier has a winning strategy if ϕ is false in M ,
• Astrolabe the pardoxifier has a winning strategy if ϕ is paradoxical in M .
Proof. We start with the case for Heloise the verifier. Let us and consider the
game state (Heloise, ϕ). We proceed by induction on the complexity of ϕ and
describe Heloise the verifier’s winning strategy for each case. Now, let ϕ be true
in M .
If ϕ is a propositional letter p which is true in M , then Heloise the verifier
wins by definition, hence has a winning strategy.
Let ϕ = ¬ψ. Then, ψ is false. By the game rules, the play continues where
Heloise is the falsifier. By the induction hypothesis (for falsifier), Heloise the
falsifier has a winning strategy for ψ. Then, she as the verifier has a winning
strategy for ¬ψ by simply playing her game as the falsifier for ψ. Thus, she has
a winning strategy for ϕ.
Now, let ϕ be a conjunction of the form χ ∧ ψ. Since, ϕ is assumed to be
true, the only way to make it true is to have χ and ψ both true. Then, by the
induction hypothesis, Heloise the verifier has a winning strategy for both χ and
ψ. Then, for ϕ, Abelard the falsifier and Astrolabe the paradoxifier make moves.
Yet, whichever move they make (whichever of χ or ψ they choose), Heloise the
verifier will have a winning strategy. Thus, for ϕ, she has a winning strategy:
whatever move Abelard and Astrolabe make, she wins.
Let ϕ be a disjunction of the form χ ∨ ψ. Then, by the induction hypothesis,
Heloise has a winning strategy for either χ or ψ, whichever is true. Then, choos-
ing the true disjunct is her winning strategy at ϕ, independent from whatever
Astrolabe chooses.
The case for Abelard the falsifier, that is, the game positions (Abelard, ϕ), is
almost identical to that of Heloise’s, hence skipped.
For Astrolabe the paradoxifier, we first assume that the given formula ϕ is
paradoxical. Let ϕ be paradoxical in M . Consider the game state (Astrolabe, ϕ)
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If ϕ is a propositional letter p which is paradoxical in M , then Astrolabe wins
the play by definition, hence has a winning strategy.
Let ϕ = ¬ψ. Then, ψ is paradoxical, too. By the game rules, Astrolabe
the paradoxifier’s rule remains the same. By the induction hypothesis, he has
a winning strategy for ψ. Then, he has a winning strategy for ϕ by simply
maintaining the same role and the strategy, and proceeding with ψ.
For ϕ = χ ∧ ψ. Since ϕ is assumed to be paradoxical, we only have two
options for χ and ψ: (1) either one of them has the truth value P and the other
has the truth value T , (2) both have the truth value P . Therefore, Astrolabe the
paradoxifier has a winning strategy for at least one of χ and ψ, by the induction
hypothesis. Then, for ϕ, Astrolabe chooses the conjunct that has the truth value
P for which he has a winning strategy already. This forms his winning strategy
for ϕ, independent from whatever move Abelard the falsifier makes.
If ϕ = χ ∨ ψ, then we have two options as well: (1) one of the disjuncts
has the truth value P and the other one has the truth value F , (2) both have
the truth value P . So, Astrolabe the paradoxifier has a winning strategy for at
least one of χ and ψ, by the induction hypothesis. Then, for the game with ϕ,
Astrolabe chooses the disjunct that has the truth value P , and this forms his
winning strategy for ϕ, independent from whatever Heloise chooses. 
Theorem 3.3 is what is called the correctness theorem for GTSLP which es-
tablishes how GTS captures the standard semantics of LP. We will refer to such
theorems with this name from now on.
In the light of Theorem 3.3, it is important to note that LP distinguishes
different trues and falses: trues that are only true (T ), falses that are only
false (F ), and trues that are also false (P ) and falses that are also true (P ). In
GTS, this distinction carries over to games allowing Astrolabe the paradoxifier to
make moves alongside Heloise the verifier and Abelard the falsifier. The purpose
of this extended set of game rules in LP is to cover the possibility of trues that
are also false and falses that are also true. In GTSLP, there are winning strategies
which cause a loss for the opponent, and there are winning strategies which do
not. Additionally, there are winning strategies that cannot guarantee the logical
truth of the formula in GTSLP. A play for p ∧ f illustrates this point, where both
Abelard and Astrolabe can have a winning strategy. But this does not directly
say anything about determining the truth value of p ∧ f . Therefore, in GTSLP,
the immediate connection between the existence of winning strategies and truth
values becomes slightly more complicated as the following theorem identifies.
Theorem 3.4. In a GTSLP verification game ΓLP(M,ϕ),
• If Heloise the verifier has a winning strategy, then ϕ is true in M ,
• If Abelard the falsifier has a winning strategy, then ϕ is false in M ,
• If Astrolabe the paradoxifier has a winning strategy, but not the other play-
ers, then ϕ is paradoxical in M .
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Proof. We start with the case for Heloise the verifier. Assume that for ϕ Heloise
the verifier has a winning strategy at state (Heloise, ϕ). The proof is by induction
on ϕ.
If ϕ is a propositional variable p for which Heloise the verifier has a winning
strategy, then p is true by definition.
If ϕ = ¬ψ, then by definition, Heloise the falsifier has a winning strategy for
ψ. By the induction hypothesis, then ψ as false. Then, ¬ψ, that is, ϕ is true.
Let ϕ = χ ∧ ψ. If Heloise the verifier has a winning strategy, then she must
have winning strategies for both χ and ψ as it is not her turn. By the induction
hypothesis both χ and ψ must be true. In this case, ϕ turns out to be true as
well.
Let ϕ = χ ∨ ψ. If Heloise the verifier has a winning strategy, this means
that Heloise has a winning strategy for at least one of χ and ψ. Then, by the
induction hypothesis one of them is true. By the truth table for LP, this makes
ϕ true as well. Notice that it is also Astrolabe the paradoxifier’s turn to choose
here. If he has a winning strategy, he can select the disjunct that gives him
a win. By the induction hypothesis, that disjunct can be paradoxical. Yet, as
the other conjunct is true (which is by assumption as Heloise has a winning
strategy), ϕ still becomes true (as T ∨ P is true).
The case for Abelard the falsifier is very similar, hence skipped.
The interesting case is that of Astrolabe the paradoxifier. Assume that for ϕ
only Astrolabe the paradoxifier has a winning strategy at position (Astrolabe, ϕ).
If ϕ is a propositional variable, and Astrolabe has a winning strategy, then
by definition ϕ is paradoxical.
If ϕ = ¬ψ, and only Astrolabe has a winning strategy, he keeps playing for ψ
as a paradoxifier. By the induction hypothesis, this means that ψ is paradoxical.
By the truth table, ϕ becomes paradoxical as well.
Now, let ϕ = χ∧ψ. If only Astrolabe the paradoxifier has a winning strategy,
this means that he has a winning strategy for either of the conjuncts (as he
can choose whichever he likes), say χ without loss of generality. Then, by the
induction hypothesis, χ is paradoxical. Since Abelard does not have a winning
strategy, by Theorem 3.3, then neither of the conjuncts is false. Thus, by the
truth table, ϕ is forced to be paradoxical as χ is paradoxical. Otherwise, if
Abelard had a winning strategy, and if one of the conjuncts was F , then P ∧
F would return F , not P disproving the claim. This is the reason why only
Astrolabe is supposed to have a winning strategy.
Finally, if ϕ = χ ∨ ψ, then if only Astrolabe the paradoxifier has a winning
strategy, then he has a winning strategy for either of the disjuncts, say χ without
loss of generality. Then, by the induction hypothesis, χ is paradoxical. Heloise
not having a winning strategy means that neither of the disjuncts is true by
Theorem 3.3. Then by the truth table, ϕ is forced to be paradoxical as χ is
paradoxical. 
It is important to note that the above theorems also show that verification
games ΓLP(M,ϕ) for LP are determined as valuations in game models are func-
tional (that is, each and every formula has exactly one truth value) and for each
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game there is at least one player with a winning strategy.
Theorem 3.4 also indicates that Astrolabe the paradoxifier’s strategy is strictly
dominated in a sense that if some other player also admits a winning strategy,
then Astrolabe’s strategy will not give him a win. This observation is another
reading of the truth table for LP given in Figure 1.
Now, as a thought-experiment, it is possible to change some game rules
in order to give a biconditional correctness theorem for GTSLP by prioritizing
some players over others. This will allow some players to dominate the others
reflecting the truth table for LP. In this new and extended reading of GTSLP,
such a move priority is given to the parents (Abelard and Heloise). They are
allowed to play first, then Astrolabe makes his move. This extension prevents
parallel moves and incorporates winning strategies into the game rules. The
revised game rules are given as follows.
• For propositional letters and negation, the rules are as before.
• Disjunction belongs to Heloise and Astrolabe; conjunction belongs to Abelard
and Astrolabe.
• If Heloise (resp. Abelard) has a winning strategy in the sub-game they
choose, the game proceeds with her (resp. his) move.
• Otherwise, Astrolabe makes a move.
The following example illustrates this modification.
Example 3.5. Let us consider the formula in Example 3.1. Given (p∧t)∨(p∧f),
Heloise first attempts to choose either of them only to realize that she does not
have a winning strategy in either of the sub-games with p ∧ t or p ∧ f . So, she
cannot make a move. Then, it becomes Astrolabe’s turn. Astrolabe chooses p∧t.
Now, Abelard attempts to choose either p or t only to realize that neither gives
him a win. So, he cannot make a move. Astrolabe makes a move, chooses p,
and wins - this is Astrolabe’s winning strategy. If Astrolabe chose p∧f , then first
Abelard would make a move and choose f for a win. Yet, Abelard still does not
have winning strategy in this game.
As we mentioned earlier, such a twist on GTSLP to recover the biconditional-
ity in the correctness theorem is ad-hoc. It incorporates the existence of winning
strategies into game rules creating a circular reasoning which results in the loss
of game theoretical intuition. This is a big price to pay to have a biconditional
version of Theorem 3.3. We shall observe a similar problem in due course for
some other logics.
For another attempt to obtain a biconditional and classical correctness the-
orem, it can be argued that the introduction of the third player is arbitrary, and
his role can be played by both players allowing them to play simultaneously.
This line of argument also suggests that Astrolabe’s win in a verification game
is identical to having both Abelard and Heloise win the play at the same time.
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The idea of covering the third truth value by some combination of the orig-
inal two truth values is not strong enough to generalize to multi-valued log-
ics. The situation gets more complicated when 4-valued logics are considered.
More importantly, from a game theoretical perspective, identifying players’ roles
(whether they are verifiers, falsifiers, paradoxifiers or else) is an important game
theoretical conceptualization in formal semantics (Hodges, 2013). Reducing
some truth values to some combinations of others in an absolute reductionist
sense eliminates the game theoretical sophistication and richness of verification
games. A play may end with the same outcome when it is played by 2 or 4
players, but it does not suggest that they are indeed the same game. The results
may be identical but the process, the play and more importantly the game the-
oretical and rational interaction among the players will not be identical. Such
an agenda will inevitably fail if we want to explore the full richness of GTS for
non-classical logics together with its logical and game theoretical implications.
In this section, we only discussed the basic system of LP. Kleene’s K3, as we
mentioned, admits the same truth table and the above GTS works for K3 with
some small modifications. Additionally, some extensions of LP, such as RM3
which admits modus ponens, or minimal LP can also be given a GTS. We leave
such extensions of LP to future work.
4 Game Semantics for First-Degree Entailment
Semantic evaluations are generally thought of as functions from logical formulas
to truth values. This ensures that each and every formula is assigned a unique
truth value. However, it is possible to replace the valuation function with a
valuation relation which can produce multiple or no truth values for logical
formulas. The system obtained in this manner is called First-degree entailment
(FDE, for short), and is due to Dunn (Anderson & Belnap, 1963; Dunn, 1976).
For the given propositional language L, the valuation relation r is defined on
L × {0, 1}. By ϕr∅, we denote the situation where ϕ is not related to any truth
value, and (with a slight abuse of notation) by ϕr{0, 1} the situation where it
is related to both truth values. FDE is a paraconsistent (inconsistency-tolerant)
and paracomplete (incompleteness-tolerant) logic. For formulas ϕ,ψ ∈ L, the
valuation r is defined inductively as follows.
• ¬ϕr1 iff ϕr0,
• ¬ϕr0 iff ϕr1,
• (ϕ ∧ ψ)r1 iff ϕr1 and ψr1,
• (ϕ ∧ ψ)r0 iff ϕr0 or ψr0,
• (ϕ ∨ ψ)r1 iff ϕr1 or ψr1,
• (ϕ ∨ ψ)r0 iff ϕr0 and ψr0.
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Notice that LP can be obtained from FDE by imposing a restriction that no
formula gets the truth value ∅.
What does the relational semantics correspond to in verification games? If
the truth value P in LP can intuitively be thought of as both true and false,
and if this allows concurrent moves in GTSLP, then the same approach should
work in game semantics for FDE as well. In FDE, unlike LP, formulas can have
no truth values which suggests that neither Heloise nor Abelard may have a
winning strategy (incompleteness-tolerance). Also, in FDE, both players can
have winning strategies (inconsistency-tolerance). Since there exists a possibil-
ity that no players may have a winning strategy, semantic games for FDE are
not determined.
We define the verification games for FDE in the standard fashion as follows
where the GTS for FDE is denoted by GTSFDE.
Definition 4.1. The tuple ΓFDE = (pi, ρ, σ, τ, δ) is a verification game for FDE
where pi = {Heloise, Abelard}, σ is composed of tuples in the form (Heloise, ϕ)
or (Abelard, ϕ) or (∅, ϕ) where ∅ denotes that no player has a turn at ϕ, and δ
is {T}. For a game ΓFDE(M,ϕ), τ is given inductively for the positions (pi, ϕ)
in σ as follows,
• if ϕ = ¬ψ, then,
– if {(Abelard,¬ψ)} ∈ τ then, {(Heloise, ψ)} ∈ τ ,
– if {(Heloise,¬ψ)} ∈ τ then, {(Abelard, ψ)} ∈ τ ,
• if ϕ = χ ∧ ψ, then {(Heloise, χ ∧ ψ), (Abelard, χ ∧ ψ)} ∈ τ ,
• if ϕ = χ ∨ ψ, then {(Heloise, χ ∨ ψ), (Abelard, χ ∨ ψ)} ∈ τ ;
and, finally, ρ is given inductively as follows.
• If ϕ is atomic, the game terminates, and Heloise wins if ϕr1, Abelard wins
if ϕr0, neither wins if ϕr∅,
• if ϕ = ¬ψ, players switch roles, and the game continues as ΓFDE(M,ψ),
• if ϕ = χ∧ψ, Abelard and Heloise choose between χ and ψ simultaneously,
• if ϕ = χ∨ψ, Abelard and Heloise choose between χ and ψ simultaneously.
Game rules for GTSFDE also include the turn function which specifies that
both players make moves at all binary connectives. A simple example can be
helpful.
Example 4.2. Consider the formula p ∧ (q ∨ r) where pr{0, 1}, qr∅ and rr0.
Then, the formula p ∧ (q ∨ r) evaluates to 0. In the verification game, Abelard
the falsifier first chooses q ∨ r, and then chooses r. Alternatively, he can also
choose p as his winning strategy, yet this also cause Heloise the verifier to win
the play.
This example is another case where the existence of winning strategies do
not directly guarantee the truth value of the formula in question.
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The correctness theorem for GTSFDE is given as follows.
Theorem 4.3. In a game ΓFDE(M,ϕ), we have the following:
• Heloise the verifier has a winning strategy if ϕr1,
• Abelard the falsifier has a winning strategy if ϕr0,
• Either of the players or no player has a winning strategy if ϕr∅.
Proof. The proof is by induction for each case.
Case for ϕr1: We start with the case for Heloise the verifier at the game
position (Heloise, ϕ). Suppose ϕr1. The cases for propositional variables and
negation are immediate.
Let ϕ = χ ∧ ψ. If ϕr1, then we have both χr1 and ψr1. By the induction
hypothesis, Heloise the verifier has winning strategies for both χ and ψ. Thus,
she has a winning strategy for ϕ. For the failure of the reverse direction, assume
that Heloise has a winning strategy. Without loss of generality, suppose that she
chooses χ. Assume further that Abelard the falsifier has a winning strategy as
well, that is, he chooses ψ. Then, by the induction hypothesis χr1 and ψr0
which forces ϕr0.
Similarly, let ϕ = χ ∨ ψ. Then, we have χr1 or ψr1. By the induction
hypothesis, Heloise the verifier has a winning strategy for χ or ψ. Therefore,
she has a winning strategy for ϕ, that is, she chooses the disjunct for which she
has a winning strategy.
Case for ϕr0: The cases for Abelard the falsifier are very similar to the
above, hence skipped.
Case for ϕr∅: Consider the position (∅, ϕ) with ϕr∅. If ϕ is a propositional
variable, by definition, no player wins. Similarly, let ϕ = ¬ψ. Then, by defini-
tion, ψr∅. By the induction hypothesis, no player has a winning strategy. Thus,
no player has a winning strategy for ϕ.
Let ϕ = χ ∧ ψ. Then, by the truth conditions for FDE, we have two options:
(1) both χr∅ and ψr∅, or (2) χr1 and ψr∅ (without loss of generality). If the
prior is the case, by the induction hypothesis, no player has a winning strategy
for χ or ψ. Thus, no player has a winning strategy for ϕ. If the latter is the case,
then Heloise the verifier has a winning strategy for ϕ as he can make a move at
a conjunction which forms his winning strategy for ϕ.
Dually, let ϕ = χ ∨ ψ. Then, by the truth conditions for FDE, we have two
options: (1) both χr∅ and ψr∅, or (2) χr0 and ψr∅ (without loss of generality).
If the prior one is the case, by the same argument as above, no player has a
winning strategy for ϕ. If the latter is the case, Astrolabe the falsifier chooses χ
which constitutes her winning strategy for ϕ. 
The above theorem suggests a different reading of determinacy. Even if
games ΓFDE(M,ϕ) are finite and expected to be determined by the Gale-Stewart
theorem, we observe that there can be cases where no player can have a winning
strategy. Therefore, due to the underlying logic, some verification games for
FDE can be undetermined. This immediately suggests a different reading of
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strategies as not functions, but as relations. We leave such extensions to future
work.
Furthermore, if we impose that the ΓFDE(M,ϕ) games need to be deter-
mined, what we obtain is a ΓLP(M,ϕ) game. On the other hand, another reason
why ΓFDE(M,ϕ) is not determined is because the game lacks a player whose
role is to force the empty truth value ∅. It is a matter of philosophical debate
whether ∅ is a truth value or whether it can be forced by a player. However, in
the current framework, we chose not to introduce a player for that role. In due
time, we will consider an extension of FDE that has four players: the verifier,
the falsifier, the paradoxifier and the nullifier.
The connection between FDE and LP can further be explicated as follows.
Corollary 4.4. For an LP model M and a formula ϕ, let M ′ be the model obtained
from M by maintaining the same carrier set and replacing the valuation function
of LP with the valuation relation of FDE as follows: T 7→ 1, F 7→ 0 and P 7→ {0, 1}.
If Heloise or Abelard has a winning strategy in ΓLP(M,ϕ), then Heloise or
Abelard has a winning strategy in ΓFDE(M ′, ϕ) respectively. If only Astrolabe has
a winning strategy in ΓLP(M,ϕ), then both Heloise and Abelard have winning
strategies in ΓFDE(M ′, ϕ).
Proof. The first part about Heloise and Abelard follows from Theorem 3.4 and
Theorem 4.3. In other words, if Heloise has a winning strategy in an LP game,
then the formula is true in LP by Theorem 3.4. The translation then translates
T of LP to 1 of FDE. Then, by Theorem 4.3, Heloise has a winning strategy in
the FDE game. The argument is similar for Abelard.
If only Astrolabe has a winning strategy for the LP game for ϕ, then by
Theorem 3.4, ϕ is paradoxical. By the translation, then ϕ is related to both 0
and 1 in FDE. By Theorem 4.3, then both Heloise and Abelard have winning
strategies in the FDE game. 
The converse of Corollary 4.4 is not true. In GTSFDE, for t ∧ f , both Abelard
and Heloise have winning strategies. Yet, in LP for a game t ∧ f , Heloise does
not have a winning strategy.
5 Game Semantics for A Relevant Logic
Relevant logics define negation by resorting to possible worlds, and this reading
renders negation as a modal operator. The idea is due to Routley and Routley
(Routley & Routley, 1972). A Routley model is a structure (W,#, v) whereW is a
set of possible worlds, # is a map from W to itself, and v is a valuation function
defined in the standard way. In this system, the semantics for disjunction and
conjunction is local, whereas for negation, possible worlds are needed. The
semantics is given as follows.
v(w,¬ϕ) = 1 iff v(#w,ϕ) = 0,
v(w,ϕ ∧ ψ) = 1 iff v(w,ϕ) = 1 and v(w,ψ) = 1,
v(w,ϕ ∨ ψ) = 1 iff v(w,ϕ) = 1 or v(w,ψ) = 1.
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We call Routleys’ system RR, and denote its GTS by GTSRR. Notice that if
#w = w, then we have the classical truth conditions. Further connections be-
tween RR and FDE or LP can be found in (Priest, 2007). We denote semantical
games in RR by ΓRR(M,ϕ,w) where M and ϕ are as before, and w ∈ W is a
possible world.
Definition 5.1. The tuple ΓRR = (pi, ρ, σ, τ, δ) is a verification game for RR
where pi = {Heloise, Abelard}, σ is the set of game states in the form of (pi, ϕ, w)
for pi ∈ pi, ϕ ∈ L and w ∈ W , τ is composed of singleton game states as there
is no parallel play, and δ is {T}. In a game ΓRR(M,ϕ,w), ρ is given as follows
inductively for a fixed w.
• If ϕ is atomic, the game terminates, and Heloise wins if ϕ is true, Abelard
wins if ϕ is false,
• if ϕ = ¬ψ, the players switch roles, and the game continues as ΓRR(M,ψ,#w),
• if ϕ = χ ∨ ψ, Heloise the verifier chooses between χ and ψ,
• if ϕ = χ ∧ ψ, Abelard the falsifier chooses between χ and ψ.
The correctness theorem for GTSRR is given as follows.
Theorem 5.2. In a game ΓRR(M,ϕ,w), Heloise the verifier has a winning strategy
if ϕ is true, and Abelard the falsifier has a winning strategy if ϕ is false.
Proof. The proof is by induction on ϕ. Let us see the case for Heloise the verifier
with the game state (Heloise, ϕ, w). The case for Abelard the falsifier is very
similar hence skipped.
Let ϕ be a propositional letter p. If p is true then, by definition, Heloise the
verifier has a winning strategy.
Let ϕ = ¬ψ. Then, the game continues at #w for ψ with switched roles,
where v(#w,ψ) = 0. Heloise becomes the falsifier at the game position (Heloise, ψ,#w).
By the induction hypothesis (for Abelard the falsifier), the falsifier has a win-
ning strategy for the play at #w for ψ. Therefore, Heloise the verifier has a
winning strategy at (Heloise,¬ψ,w) which forms her winning strategy for ϕ at
(Heloise, ϕ, w).
The cases for conjunction and disjunction are as expected thus omitted. 
Notice that ΓRR(M,ϕ,w) games are not necessarily zero-sum. In order to
see this, let w |= ¬p for a propositional atom p. Stipulate further that #(w) = w.
Now, by definition w |= p. Therefore, by Theorem 5.2, both Abelard and Heloise
have winning strategies in ΓRR(M,p ∧ ¬p, w) where M and w are as above.
Therefore, Heloise can have a winning strategy for a false (at the same time
true) formula, and likewise for Abelard.
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6 Game Semantics for a Connexive Logic
As Wansing puts it, connexive logic is a “comparatively little-known and to
some extent neglected branch of non-classical logic” (Wansing, 2015). Even
if it is under-studied, its philosophical roots can be traced back to Aristotle and
Boethius.
Connexive logic is defined as a system which satisfies the following two
schemes of conditionals:
• Aristotle’s Theses: ¬(¬ϕ→ ϕ)
• Boethius’ Theses: (ϕ→ ¬ψ)→ ¬(ϕ→ ψ)
The philosophical motivation behind the above schemata goes back to early
medieval philosophy where unintuitive results about material implication re-
ceived some interest. In modern days, connexive logics can also be viewed as
part of the agenda of relevant logic, which takes the material implication cen-
tral in its inquiry. In this paper, we will set such historical and philosophical
discussions aside and focus on the formal semantics.
As in many different families of non-classical logic, there has been suggested
a variety of connexive logics in the literature. In this work, we discuss one of
the earliest examples of connexive logics CC, which is due to McCall (McCall,
1966).
The logic CC is axiomatized by adding the scheme (ϕ → ϕ) → ¬(ϕ → ¬ϕ)
to the axiomatization of classical propositional logic. The rules of inference for
CC is modus ponens and adjunction, which is given as ` ϕ, ` ψ ∴ ` ϕ ∧ ψ. As
usual, we consider CC with the standard propositional syntax L.
The semantics for CC is given with 4 truth values: T , t, f and F which can
be viewed as “logical necessity”, “contingent truth”, “contingent falsehood”, and
“logical impossibility” respectively (Routley & Montgomery, 1968). In CC, the
designated truth values are T and t. The truth table for CC is given in Figure 2.
¬
T F
t f
f t
F T
∧ T t f F
T T t f F
t t T F f
f f F f F
F F f F f
∨ T t f F
T t T t T
t T t T t
f t T F f
F T t f F
Figure 2: The truth table for CC.
Notice that even if there are paraconsistent connexive logics, CC in particu-
lar is not paraconsistent. It is possible to obtain paraconsistent connexive logics
based on relevant logic RR, which we discussed earlier, or by splitting the satis-
faction relation into negative and positive satisfaction (Wansing, 2015).
The CC truth table, similar to some other non-classical logics considered
in this work, exhibits an interesting property that for some binary connectives
and truth values, two truth values produce a third truth value. For instance,
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in CC with a brief abuse of notation, we have t ∧ f ≡ F . We generalize this
phenomenon as follows.
Definition 6.1. Let L be a n-valued logic where n ≥ 2, {Vi}i≤n the set of
truth-values, and {Cj}j∈J be set of binary logical connectives for some index
set J . Then, L is said to have the hereditary condition if for all i, i′ ≤ n, j ∈ J ,
Cj(Vi, Vi′) evaluates to either Vi or Vi′ . In short, logical connectives cannot
output a truth value different than the input values. This definition can easily
be extended to k-ary logical connectives.
Thus, CC lacks the hereditary condition which complicates its game theoret-
ical semantics. For instance, if the verification game is for t∧f , how can Abelard
the falsifier guarantee a win?
First, following our earlier methodology, we introduce 4 players for 4 truth
values. The truth value T is forced by Heloise, F by Abelard, t by Aristotle and
f by Boethius. We denote the game theoretical semantics for CC with 4 players
by GTSCC.
Since CC lacks the hereditary condition, we stipulate that the players form
coalitions. The idea of forming coalitions in logical games for a win is not new,
and its origins in (modal) logic can be found in (Pauly, 2002). In GTSCC, we
impose that “Heloise and Aristotle” and “Abelard and Boethius” form two teams,
which can be viewed as truth-maker and false-maker coalitions respectively.
Now, we define the semantic verification game for CC as follows.
Definition 6.2. The tuple ΓCC = (pi, ρ, σ, τ, δ) is a verification game for CC
where pi = {Heloise, Aristole, Boethius, Abelard}, σ is the set of tuples in the
form of (Heloise/Aristotle, ϕ) and (Abelard/Boethius, ϕ) for well-formed for-
mula ϕ, τ is composed of singleton game positions as there is no parallel play,
and δ is {T, t}. And, for a game ΓCC(M,ϕ), ρ is given inductively as follows.
• If ϕ is atomic, the game terminates, and Heloise wins if ϕ has the truth
value T , Aristotle wins if ϕ has the truth value t, Boethius wins if ϕ has
the truth value f and Abelard wins if ϕ has the truth value F ,
• if ϕ = ¬ψ, Heloise assumes Abelard’s role, Aristotle assumes Boethius’
role, Boethius assumes Aristotle’s role and Abelard assumes Heloise’s role,
and the game continues as ΓCC(M,ψ),
• if ϕ = χ ∧ ψ, false-makers simultaneously choose between χ and ψ,
• if ϕ = χ ∨ ψ, truth-makers simultaneously choose between χ and ψ.
In the above definition, game states (Heloise/Aristotle, ϕ) and (Abelard/Boethius, ϕ)
denote the the truth-maker coalition and false-maker coalition respectively. In
short, these coalitions are considered as single agents.
As an alternative to the above definition and a thought experiment, it can be
suggested that instead of forming coalitions, players may be allowed to play in
parallel just as in GTSLP. In this case, it can be argued that conjunction can be
assigned to Abelard and Boethius, and disjunction to Heloise and Aristotle. The
following example considers this hypothetical case as well.
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Example 6.3. By a slight abuse of notation, let us denote with f, t, F, T the
atoms with truth values f, t, F, T respectively. Let us consider the formula (F ∧
f)∨ (T ∧ t) which evaluates to T in CC. In this play, we expect the truth-makers
to win. However, they cannot individually achieve a win. If Heloise makes a
move to T ∧ t, then she needs Aristole to win since Abelard or Boethius can
choose whatever they wish at T ∧ t. Thus, by forming a coalition, Aristotle and
Heloise (the truth-makers) can guarantee a win in this play.
However, following the hypothetical case of allowing parallel plays where
individual players play in parallel without a coalition, it can be observed that
Heloise cannot guarantee a win. First, she chooses the conjunct T ∧ t. But
then, Abelard and Boethius can choose whatever they like, in particular t. Thus,
Heloise cannot have a winning strategy for a formula with truth value T . This
justifies why we need coalitions in GTSCC.
(F ∧ f) ∨ (T ∧ t)
Heloise
F ∧ f
Abelard
F f
Boethius
F f
T ∧ t
Abelard
T t
Boethius
T t
Aristotle
F ∧ f
Abelard
F f
Boethius
F f
T ∧ t
Abelard
T t
Boethius
T t
We give the biconditional correctness theorem for GTSCC as follows.
Theorem 6.4. In a GTSCC verification game ΓCC(M,ϕ),
• truth-makers have a winning strategy if and only if ϕ has the truth value t
or T in M ,
• false-makers have a winning strategy if and only if ϕ has the truth value f
or F in M .
Proof. We present a proof only for truth-makers as the cases for false-makers
are similar. In order to make it easier to follow, we will give proof without being
fully formal on the game positions.
Left-to-Right Direction Assume that truth-makers have a winning strategy
for the verification game ΓCC(M,ϕ), we will show by induction on ϕ that the
truth value of ϕ is either t or T .
Let ϕ be a propositional variable p. If truth-makers Heloise and Aristotle
have winning strategies, then by definition of GTSCC, the truth value of ϕ is
either T or t.
Now, let ϕ = ¬ψ for some ψ. Assume that truth-makers have a winning
strategy for ΓCC(M,ϕ). By the game rules, Heloise and Aristotle assume the
role of false-makers, and will have a winning strategy as false makers for the
game ΓCC(M,ψ). By the induction hypothesis, then, ψ will be either f or F .
Then, by the truth table for CC in Figure 2, ϕ has the truth value t or T .
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As the third step of the induction, let ϕ = χ∧ψ and assume that truth-makers
have a winning strategy for ΓCC(M,ϕ). Then, by definition, false-makers make
a move and choose either of the conjunct, depending on their strategy. Since
truth-makers have a winning strategy for ϕ whichever conjunct false-makers
choose, they will still have a winning strategy. By the induction hypothesis, then
the truth-makers have a winning strategy for both χ and ψ. By the induction
hypothesis, the truth values of χ and ψ are either t or T . The truth table for
CC in Figure 2 shows that any conjunction of ts and T s produces a t or T truth
value. Thus, the truth value of χ∧ψ is still t or T which gives us the truth value
of ϕ.
Finally, let ϕ = χ∨ψ and assume that truth-makers have a winning strategy
for ΓCC(M,ϕ). Then, by definition truth-makers will choose either of the dis-
junct to employ their winning strategy, say χ without loss of generality. Then,
by induction hypothesis, as truth makers also have a winning strategy for χ, the
truth value of χ is either t or T . The truth table for CC in Figure 2 shows that
any disjunction of a t or T with any other truth value still produces a t or T
truth value. Thus, the truth value of χ ∨ ψ is still t or T , independent from the
truth value of ψ. Thus, the truth value of ϕ is either t or T .
Right-to-left Direction Let ϕ have the truth value t or T in M .
If ϕ is a propositional letter p with a truth value t or T , then truth-makers
win the game by definition, hence they possess a winning strategy.
Let ϕ = ¬ψ. Then, ψ has the truth value f or F . By the game rules, now the
game continues where Heloise and Aristotle are false-makers. By the induction
hypothesis (for false-makers), the coalition of Heloise and Astrolabe as false-
makers have a winning strategy for ψ. Then, taking one step back, they, as
truth-makers, have a winning strategy for ϕ.
Now, let ϕ be a conjunction of the form χ ∧ ψ. Since, ϕ is assumed to
have the truth values t or T , according to the truth table for CC in Figure 2,
the only way to realize ϕ as t or T is to have χ and ψ with truth values t or
T (or any combination thereof). Thus, whichever move false-makers make at
χ∧ψ, truth-makers will have a winning strategy, by induction hypothesis. Then,
truth-makers will have a winning strategy for ψ.
Finally, let ϕ be a disjunction of the form χ ∨ ψ. Then, truth-makers make a
move and choose the disjunct with the truth value t or T . According to the truth
table for CC in Figure 2, the only way to realize χ ∨ ψ with a truth value t or T
is to have at least one of disjunct with a truth value either t or T . By induction
hypothesis, truth-makers have a winning strategy for that disjunct with the truth
value t or T . Thus, at χ ∨ ψ, truth makers simply choose that disjunct which
form the winning strategy of truth makers for ϕ.
This concludes the proof. 
It is possible to consider teams and coalitions as individual players with an
aim of reducing the verification game to a two-player game. This simply mimics
a translation from CC to classical logic where T and t are assigned to T , and F
and f are assigned to F .
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From a game theoretical perspective, this amounts to loss of information.
Identifying two players with different goals to force the play to a “necessary
truth” win and to a “contingent truth” win, with a single player to force the play
to a “truth” win, does not do justice to the verification game for CC. Players
may have similar goals and can form coalitions, yet this by no means entails
that they are identical players with identical roles.
The major contribution of CC to GTS is that it introduces coalitions into ver-
ification games in a natural way. Coalition formation directly reflects the truth
table of the logic in question and its philosophical underpinnings. Therefore,
some other multi-valued logical systems with similar properties can possibly be
given a coalition-based GTS.
7 Game Semantics for Belnap’s Four Valued Logic
Belnap’s four valued logic (BL, for short) introduces two additional truth val-
ues besides the classical ones. The truth value P , as before, represents over-
valuation, and N represents under-valuation. Traditionally, P stands for both
truth values and N stands for neither of the truth values. As the truth table in
Figure 3 indicates, P and N are the fixed-points under negation.
¬
T F
P P
N N
F T
∧ T P N F
T T P N F
P P P F F
N N F N F
F F F F F
∨ T P N F
T T T T T
P T P T P
N T T N N
F T P N F
Figure 3: The truth table for BL.
As can be seen from the truth table, similar to CC, BL does not admit the
hereditary condition. In the case of BL, with a slight abuse of notation, the
problematic formulas are P ∨N ≡ T and P ∧N ≡ F . A Hasse-style truth value
lattice for BL is given in Figure 4.
T
P N
F
Figure 4: Hasse Diagram for BL.
The above Hasse diagram illustrates the standard method to compute dis-
junction and conjunction of two truth values as the least upper bound and the
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greatest lower bound of the two values respectively. Then, with a slight abuse of
notation, it is possible to read off P ∨N ≡ T and P ∧N ≡ F from the diagram.
For simplicity, we will take the designated values for BL as {P, T}.
The truth combinations P ∨N ≡ T and P ∧N ≡ F suggest that our standard
approach may not work for BL. For a true formula, Heloise the verifier may have
to choose P or N as her end-state for a win. Similarly, Abelard the falsifier may
end up with a P or N state as well.
As before, we introduce 4 players for 4 truth values. The truth value T is
forced by Heloise, F by Abelard, P by Astrolabe and N by Bernard6. In this
case, at the beginning of the play, Heloise is the verifier, Abelard is the falsifier,
Astrolabe is the paradoxifier, and Bernard is the nullifier. We denote the game
theoretical semantics for BL with 4 players by GTSBL.
Similar to earlier games, the first problem is to assign players’ roles to the
connectives. But this time, BL lacks the hereditary condition. Now, similar to
our methodology for GTSCC, we can consider coalitions and form two teams as
“Heloise and Astrolabe” and “Abelard and Bernard”. In this case, the disjunc-
tion will belong to the team of “Heloise and Astrolabe” and the conjunction to
‘Abelard and Bernard”. Let us test this hypothetical idea in the following exam-
ple.
Example 7.1. Let us consider the formula (n∧p)∨(n∨p) which evaluates to T .
In this game, we expect the coalition of Heloise the verifier and Astrolabe the
falsifier win as a coalition even if neither of the end-nodes has the truth value T .
Simply put, in this case Heloise will start playing and pass the ball to Astrolabe
for a win.
First, Heloise makes a move and chooses n∨ p. Because if she chooses n∧ p,
then the coalition of Abelard and Bernard may choose n and win. Then, at n∨p,
Astrolabe chooses p which is a win for the coalition of Heloise and Astrolabe.
(n ∧ p) ∨ (n ∨ p)
Heloise
n ∧ p
Abelard
n p
Bernard
n p
n ∨ p
Heloise
n p
Astrolabe
n p
Astrolabe
n ∧ p
Abelard
n p
Bernard
n p
n ∨ p
Heloise
n p
Astrolabe
n p
In the above example and thought experiment, the idea of forming coali-
tions for BL verification games seem to work. However, from a philosophical
perspective, it seems to create a more ambiguous case. For example, for the
case when the coalition of Heloise and Astrolabe wins, it is not possible to know
the truth value of the formula in question. Is it T (after Heloise) or P (after As-
trolabe)? In the case of GTSCC, the aforementioned ambiguity might have been
considered relatively less serious as the resulting truth value of the coalition-led
6After Abelard’s rival Bernard of Clairvaux.
25
game was either one of the trues or one of the falses. Simply put, the goal
and the purpose of the coalitions in GTSCC was clear: truth-makers and false-
makers formed their respective teams. However, it does not seem to be the
case in GTSBL. In order to remedy this problem, we suggest a radical version of
simultaneous play for GTSBL. We associate conjunction with Abelard the falsi-
fier, Astrolabe the paradoxifier and Bernard the nullifier; and disjunction with
Heloise the verifier, Astrolabe the paradoxifier and Bernard the nullifier. Also,
we take special care of the problematic formulas.
We define the semantic verification game for BL for 4 players as follows in
a rather unusual way. Notice that for simplicity in the argument we associate
players with their roles.
Definition 7.2. The tuple ΓBL = (pi, ρ, σ, τ, δ) is a verification game for BL
where pi = {Heloise, Astrolabe, Abelard, Bernard}, σ is the set of tuples (pi, ϕ)
for pi ∈ pi and well-formed formula ϕ, and δ is {T, P}. For a game ΓBL(M,ϕ),
τ is given inductively for the positions (pi, ϕ) in σ as follows,
• if ϕ = ¬ψ, then,
– if {(Abelard,¬ψ)} ∈ τ then, {(Heloise, ψ)} ∈ τ ,
– if {(Heloise,¬ψ)} ∈ τ then, {(Abelard, ψ)} ∈ τ ,
– if {(Astrolabe,¬ψ)} ∈ τ then, {(Astrolabe, ψ)} ∈ τ ,
– if {(Bernard,¬ψ)} ∈ τ then, {(Bernard, ψ)} ∈ τ ,
• if ϕ = χ∧ψ, then {(Abelard, χ∧ψ), (Astrolabe, χ∧ψ), (Bernard, χ∧ψ)} ∈
τ ,
• if ϕ = χ∨ψ, then {(Heloise, χ∨ψ), (Astrolabe, χ∨ψ), (Bernard, χ∧ψ)} ∈ τ ;
and, finally, ρ is given inductively as follows
• If ϕ is atomic, the game terminates, and Heloise wins if ϕ has the truth
value T , Astrolabe wins if ϕ has the truth value P , Bernard wins if ϕ has
the truth value N and Abelard wins if ϕ has the truth value F ,
• if ϕ = ¬ψ, Heloise assumes Abelard’s role, Abelard assumes Heloise’s role,
Astrolabe and Bernard keep their previous roles, and the game continues
as ΓBL(M,ψ),
• if ϕ = χ∧ψ where only Bernard has a winning strategy for ΓBL(M,χ) and
only Astrolabe has a winning strategy for ΓBL(M,ψ), then Abelard wins,
• if ϕ = χ ∧ ψ, for other cases, Abelard, Astrolabe and Bernard choose
simultaneously between χ and ψ,
• if ϕ = χ∨ψ where only Bernard has a winning strategy for ΓBL(M,χ) and
only Astrolabe has a winning strategy for ΓBL(M,ψ), then Heloise wins,
• if ϕ = χ ∨ ψ, for other cases, Heloise, Astrolabe and Bernard choose
simultaneously between χ and ψ.
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The unusual game rules about P ∧ N and P ∨ N stem from the truth table
for BL, and the price we have to pay is to incorporate the existence of winning
strategies into the semantics - similar to what we observed for LP when we
inquired about the possibility of obtaining a biconditional correctness theorem.
It is important to note that this unusual semantics underlines the significance
of game composition in non-classical games. In other words, if the winning
strategy of Bernard and the winning strategy of Astrolabe is composed disjunc-
tively, what we obtain is a win for Heloise. Similarly, if the winning strategy of
Bernard and the winning strategy of Astrolabe is composed conjunctively, what
we obtain is a win for Heloise.
The one-directional correctness theorem for GTSBL is given as follows.
Theorem 7.3. In a GTSBL verification game ΓBL(M,ϕ),
• Heloise the verifier has a winning strategy if ϕ evaluates to T in M ,
• Abelard the falsifier has a winning strategy if ϕ evaluates to F in M ,
• Astrolabe the paradoxifier has a winning strategy if ϕ evaluates to P in M ,
• Bernard the nullifier has a winning strategy if ϕ evaluates to N in M .
Proof. The proof is an induction on the complexity of ϕ for each players respect-
ing the different cases for N ∧ P and N ∨ P , and is very similar to the previous
cases. Hence, few cases for Heloise and Bernard will be given in this proof.
Let us start with Heloise the verifier at position (Heloise, ϕ). The cases for
propositional variables and negation is immediate. The case for disjunction
N ∨ P follows directly from the definition and is a win for Heloise.
For the cases for other disjunctions, Heloise the verifier chooses the disjunct
with the truth value T which gives her a win by the induction hypothesis. And
this win constitutes her winning strategy for the original formula ϕ.
For conjunction ϕ = χ ∧ ψ, by the truth table for BL in Figure 3, there
is only one option. That is, both ψ and χ are true. Thus, whatever Abelard
the falsifier, Bernard the nullifier or Astrolabe the paradoxifier chooses, their
choice will have the truth value T . By the induction hypothesis, then Heloise
the verifier has a winning strategy for whatever choice the other players make
for the conjuncts. And that is the winning strategy for Heloise for ϕ.
For Bernard the nullifier at the game position (Bernard, ϕ), the cases for
propositional variables and the negation follow directly from the definitions.
For ϕ = χ ∧ ψ with a truth value N , it can be observed in the truth table
for BL in Figure 3 that at least one of the conjuncts must have the truth value
N , say χ without loss of generality. Then, Bernard the nullifier chooses χ. By
the induction hypothesis, Bernard the nullifier has a winning strategy for the
verification game for χ at (Bernard, χ). Therefore, choosing χ, the conjunct
with a truth value N is Bernard the nullifier’s winning strategy at (Bernard, ϕ).
If ϕ = χ ∧ ψ, and χ and ψ have truth values N and P respectively, the
theorem holds vacuously for Bernard the nullifier as he is not allowed to make
a move at this point by the game rules.
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For ϕ = χ∨ψ with a truth value N , then by the truth table for BL in Figure 3,
at least one of the disjuncts has the truth value N , and Bernard the nullifier
chooses that conjunct, say χ. By the induction hypothesis, he has a winning
strategy at the game state (Bernard, χ). Then, he has a winning strategy for ϕ
at state (Bernard, ϕ).
Similarly, if ϕ = χ∨ ψ, and χ and ψ have truth values N and P respectively,
the theorem holds vacuously for Bernard the nullifier as he is not allowed to
make a move at this point by the game rules.
As we argued, the cases for Abelard the falsifier and Astrolabe the paradox-
ifier are very similar, hence skipped.
This concludes the proof. 
The converse of the theorem does not immediately hold for obvious reasons.
For example, in the game ΓBL(M,p∨n), Astrolabe the paradoxifier and Bernard
the nullifier have winning strategies as well, but this does not entail that the
formula has the truth value P or N .
Theorem 7.3 starts from the truth values and establishes the existence of
(non-exclusive) winning strategies. Parallel plays introduce the possibility of
the existence of winning strategies for multiple players. Therefore, it is impor-
tant to ask whether the converse of Theorem 7.3 holds or more importantly,
under which conditions the converse of Theorem 7.3 holds. The following result
suggests a restriction where the existence of winning strategies necessarily de-
termine the truth value of the formula in question, similar to Theorem 3.4. It
also reflects the algebraic structure of BL given in Figure 4.
Theorem 7.4. In a GTSBL verification game ΓBL(M,ϕ),
• If Heloise the verifier has a winning strategy, then ϕ evaluates to T ,
• If Abelard the falsifier has a winning strategy, then ϕ evaluates to F ,
• If only Astrolabe the paradoxifier has a winning strategy, then ϕ evaluates
to P ,
• If only Bernard the nullifier has a winning strategy, then ϕ evaluates to N
in the model M .
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of ϕ for each player.
The cases for Heloise the verifier and Abelard the falsifier are similar to
previous cases, except the cases for χ ∧ ψ and χ ∨ ψ where χ, ψ are formulas
with truth values N and P .
Let us consider the case for ϕ = χ ∧ ψ where only Bernard has a winning
strategy for ΓBL(M,χ) and only Astrolabe has a winning strategy for ΓBL(M,ψ).
Then, by the relevant parts of this theorem, χ evaluates to N and ψ evaluates
to B. Then by the truth table for BL given in Figure 3 and by Theorem 7.3, ϕ
evaluates to T and Heloise admits a winning strategy.
The other cases including χ ∨ ψ where χ, ψ are formulas with truth values
N and P respectively are very similar.
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Next is the case for Astrolabe the paradoxifier. The cases for propositional
variables and the negation is immediate as Astrolabe keeps his role in the case
of negation.
Let us assume ϕ = χ ∧ ψ where only Astrolabe has a winning strategy in
ΓBL(M,ϕ). By this restriction, the case where only Bernard has a winning strat-
egy for ΓBL(M,χ) and only Astrolabe has a winning strategy for ΓBL(M,ψ) is
excluded (as also it was covered earlier).
Now, for ϕ = χ ∧ ψ, Abelard, Astrolabe and Bernard choose simultaneously.
Since, only Astrolabe has a winning strategy, neither Abelard nor Bernard has
winning strategies for neither of the conjuncts χ nor ψ. Astrolabe now chooses
one of the conjuncts as part of his winning strategy. Assume he chooses χ
without loss of generalization. By the induction hypothesis, χ evaluates to the
truth value P . By the truth table given for BL in Figure 3, we have two cases for
the truth value of ϕ: P or F .
Next, we eliminate the cases for F . Formula ϕ evaluates to F only if ψ
is F or N . By the relevant part of this theorem and by the assumption that
Abelard cannot have a winning strategy for for ϕ, it follows that ψ cannot be F .
Similarly, ψ cannot be N . If it was, then by Theorem 7.3 Bernard the nullifier
would have a winning strategy for ΓBL(M,ψ). Since, by the game rules, Bernard
is allowed to make a move for ϕ = χ∧ψ, then he would have a winning strategy
for ΓBL(M,ϕ) which would contradict with the assumption that only Astrolabe
had a winning strategy in that game. Thus, ϕ can only have the truth value P .
The case for disjunction for Astrolabe is similar, hence omitted.
Moreover, the case for Bernard the nullifier is very similar to that of Astro-
labe’s, hence left to the reader.
This completes the proof. 
Theorem 7.4 shows how restrictions on the existence of winning strategies
guarantee the truth value of the formula in question.
Logics FDE and BL seem rather similar. There can be given effective trans-
lations between their truth values, and their philosophical motivations look
closely related. However, the games we introduced for them are very differ-
ent. The logical and technical differences between BL and FDE surface more
clearly from the view point of GTS.
Furthermore, Theorem 7.4 suggests how we should understand the domi-
nance of strategies in GTSBL. The theorem states how the existence of winning
strategies - without depending on the existence of winning strategies for other
players - determine (or do not determine) the truth value of the formula in
question. This is a fruitful and interesting future research direction and relates
to the elimination of dominated strategies as a solution concept in game theory.
We leave such extension to future work.
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8 Translating Games
In a recent work, an efficient translation between three-valued logics and modal
logic S5 was given (Kooi & Tamminga, 2013). A model of modal logic S5 is de-
fined as a tuple (W,R, V ) where W is a non-empty set, R is an equivalence
relation on W × W and V is the standard valuation function. The logic S5
generates equivalence classes and the modal operator can be used to define a
new paraconsistent negation ¬ (Be´ziau, 2005). Furthermore, there have been
suggested various consequence relations between modal S4 and various intu-
itionistic and dual-intuitionistic logics (Shramko, 2016). For that reason, it can
be inquired whether there exist further connections between modal and para-
consistent logics. In what follows, we present a game theoretical connection
between modal and paraconsistent logic based on the translations in (Kooi &
Tamminga, 2013; Shramko, 2016).
Briefly, the language LM of S5 is obtained by taking the syntactic closure
of propositional logic with the possibility modal operator ♦ and the necessity
modal operator  in the usual way. Semantically, for w ∈ W in a model M , we
have the following.
M,w |= ϕ iff ∀v.Rwv →M, v |= ϕ
M,w |= ♦ϕ iff ∃v.Rwv ∧M, v |= ϕ
Furthermore, in S5, a formula ϕ is true at a state w in a model M if and
only if it is true at all v ∈ [w] where [w] denotes the partition of W that contains
w. Dually, a formula ♦ϕ is true at state w in a model M if and only if it is true
at some v ∈ [w].
GTS for the classical modal logic is well-known. “Diamond” formulas are
assigned to Heloise the verifier whereas the “Box” formulas are assigned to
Abelard the falsifier. Also, similar to the RR, formulas in LM are associated
with a possible world. For modal formulas, the position of the game token for
the next move is determined by the accessibility relation.
In this section, we give a translation of LP (and K3) into S5 via GTS. The
translation is built on the following observation:
“In an S5-model there are three mutually exclusive and jointly ex-
haustive possibilities for each atomic formula p: either p is true in
all possible worlds, or p is true in some possible worlds and false in
others, or p is false in all possible worlds” (Kooi & Tamminga, 2013).
The translations TrLP : L 7→ LM and TrK3 : L 7→ LM for LP and K3 re-
spectively are given as follows, where p is a propositional variable (Kooi & Tam-
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minga, 2013).
TrLP(p) = ♦p
TrK3(p) = p
TrLP(¬ϕ) = ¬TrK3(ϕ)
TrK3(¬ϕ) = ¬TrLP(ϕ)
TrLP(ϕ ∧ ψ) = TrLP(ϕ) ∧ TrLP(ψ)
TrK3(ϕ ∧ ψ) = TrK3(ϕ) ∧ TrK3(ψ)
TrLP(ϕ ∨ ψ) = TrLP(ϕ) ∨ TrLP(ψ)
TrK3(ϕ ∨ ψ) = TrK3(ϕ) ∨ TrK3(ψ)
The translation is a co-induction, and generates fully modalized formulas. For
example, the translation of the LP formula p ∧ ¬q is ♦p ∧ ¬q in S5 - every
proposition generates a modal formula in S5. More interestingly, the translation
of the LP formula p∧¬p is ♦p∧¬p in S5, which is equivalent to ♦p∧♦¬p not
necessarily inconsistent in S5. However, the same formula p∧¬p translates from
K3 to S5 as p∧¬p which is contradictory. Moreover, TrLP(p∨¬p) = ♦p∨♦¬p
which holds in S5, while TrK3(p∨¬p) = p∨¬pwhich does not hold in general
in S5.
As the authors underlined, for fully modalized formulas in S5, a formula is
true somewhere in an S5 model if and only if it is true everywhere in the model.
This fact is due to the frame properties of S5. We refer the reader to (Kooi &
Tamminga, 2013) for a detailed exposition of the translation and its correctness
proof.
Given ΓLP = (pi, ρ, σ, τ, δ), we define ΓS5 = (pi′, ρ′, σ′, τ ′, δ′) as follows: pi′ =
{Heloise,Abelard}, δ′ = {1}; ρ′, σ′, and τ ′ are rules, positions and position of
game token of verifications games for (classical) S5, respectively. Similarly, a
win for the verifier is the situation when the play terminates with a true atom.
Dually, a player terminated with a false atom brings a win to the falsifier.
Furthermore, given an LP model M with valuation V , there exists a cor-
responding S5 model M ′ (Kooi & Tamminga, 2013). Let us describe how
M ′ = (W ′, V ′) is constructed. Let W ′ = {w,w′}, and for all propositional
variables, we define V ′ as follows for truth values T, F and P of LP:
V ′(p) = W ′ iff V (p) = {T}
V ′(p) = {w} iff V (p) = {P}
V ′(p) = ∅ iff V (p) = {F}
That is, true formulas are true everywhere in the S5 model, false formulas are
false everywhere, paradoxical formulas are true somewhere - not everywhere,
not nowhere.
The following example illustrates the games we have defined.
Example 8.1. Let us reconsider Example 3.1. In this example, the formula
(p ∧ t) ∨ (p ∧ f) which evaluates to P in LP was examined. In this LP game,
Astrolabe the paradoxifier has a winning strategy.
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Now, Tr((p ∧ t) ∨ (p ∧ f)) = (♦p ∧ ♦t) ∨ (♦p ∧ ♦f). In this game in S5, we
expect both players have a winning strategy.
The first move is due to Heloise. She chooses ♦p ∧ ♦t. Otherwise, if she
chooses ♦p ∧ ♦f , then Abelard may choose ♦f which would result in Heloise
not having a winning strategy.
Now, at ♦p ∧ ♦t, Abelard chooses ♦p. Otherwise, he cannot possibly win.
At ♦p, however, he chooses the state in S5 model (that is w according to the
model defined earlier) at which the atom p is false. But, by the observation that
V (¬p) = V (p), the very same state in M ′ also verifies p. So, this move brings
both players a win as ¬p has the same extension as p.
Thus, both players have a winning strategies in the S5 game ΓS5 for the
given formula in this model.
The following theorem establishes the correctness of the translation for LP.7
Theorem 8.2. Let ΓLP(M,ϕ) be given. Then, there exists a corresponding S5
model M ′ and,
• if Heloise the verifier has a winning strategy in ΓLP(M,ϕ), then she has a
winning strategy in ΓS5(M ′,TrLP(ϕ)),
• if Abelard the falsifier has a winning strategy in ΓLP(M,ϕ), then he has a
winning strategy in ΓS5(M ′,TrLP(ϕ)),
• if only Astrolabe the paradoxifier has a winning strategy in ΓLP(M,ϕ), then
both Abelard and Heloise have winning strategies in ΓS5(M ′,TrLP(ϕ)).
Proof. The theorem is given for LP and S5 and is a co-induction on ϕ. For this
reason, we assume the correctness of a similar theorem for K3 and S5 whose
proof requires the correctness of the current theorem. Here, we present only
the proof of the translation between LP and S5.
First of all, let us observe again how M ′ = (W ′, V ′) is constructed. Let
W ′ = {w,w′}, and for propositional variable p, we define V ′ as follows for
truth values T, F and P of LP:
V ′(p) = W ′ iff V (p) = {T}
V ′(p) = {w} iff V (p) = {P}
V ′(p) = ∅ iff V (p) = {F}
Now, assume that Heloise the verifier has a winning strategy for ϕ in LP. Let
us proceed by induction on ϕ. If ϕ is a propositional letter p, then p is true in LP.
Then, it translates to S5 as ♦p, which is a turn for Heloise the verifier. Then, the
game in S5 starts by Heloise with ♦p, and she can choose any state in the model
as p is true everywhere. This is her winning strategy in ΓS5(M ′,TrLP(ϕ)).
For ϕ = ¬ψ, suppose Heloise the verifier has a winning strategy for ¬ψ in
LP. By the translation, she has a winning strategy for ¬TrK3(ψ) in S5. So, by
the assumed similar theorem for K3 and S5, the falsifier has a winning strategy
7A similar theorem can also be given for K3 very easily.
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in S5 for TrK3(ψ). Then, in S5 Heloise the verifier has a winning strategy for
¬TrK3(ψ) which is TrLP(¬ψ). Thus, Heloise the verifier has a winning strategy
for TrLP(ϕ) in S5.
The cases for conjunction and disjunction are immediate. Also, the case for
Abelard the falsifier is very similar, hence skipped.
The case for Astrolabe the paradoxifier is interesting. Assume that only
Astrolabe the paradoxifier has a winning strategy for ϕ in LP. Then by Theo-
rem 3.4, ϕ has the truth value P .
As the first step of the induction, assume ϕ = p for a propositional variable
p. This translates as ♦p and is true at w in M ′, as observed already. However,
as V (p) = V (¬p) in LP, ♦¬p (which is TrLP(¬p)) is also true at w. Heloise the
verifier makes a move to w, which her only possibility to verify ♦p. Yet, this
move also constitutes a win for Abelard the falsifier. Thus, both players have
winning strategies for ϕ = p in ΓS5(M ′,TrLP(ϕ)).
The case for negation for Abelard the paradoxifier is obvious as the nega-
tion of a paradoxical formula is paradoxical. Similarly, the cases for the binary
connectives are immediate, hence skipped. 
Next, we discuss the converse of Theorem 8.2. For this purpose, we start
with the following definition.
For an LP valuation v, and a model M of S5, v and M are said to be TrLP-
equivalent if for all ϕ ∈ L we have (i) 1 ∈ v∗(ϕ) ⇔ M |=S5 TrLP(ϕ), and (ii)
0 ∈ v∗(ϕ) ⇔ M 6|=S5 TrK3(ϕ), where v∗ is the (truth table) function based on
v that maps formulas to truth values of LP. Based on various results in (Kooi &
Tamminga, 2013), we now prove the following.
Theorem 8.3. Let M be an S5 model, ϕ ∈ L with an associated verification game
ΓS5(M,ϕ). Then, there exists an LP model M ′ and a game ΓLP(M ′, ϕ) where,
• if Heloise the verifier has a winning strategy for ΓS5(M,ϕ) at each point in
M , then Heloise has a winning strategy in ΓLP(M ′, ϕ),
• if Abelard the falsifier has a winning strategy for ΓS5(M,ϕ) at each point in
M , then Abelard has a winning strategy in ΓLP(M ′, ϕ),
• if Heloise or Abelard has a winning strategy for ΓS5(M,ϕ) at some points
but not all in M , then Astrolabe has a winning strategy in ΓLP(M ′, ϕ).
Proof. As we observed, the propositions that are true everywhere are associated
with the LP truth value T , the propositions that are true nowhere with F , and
the propositions that are true somewhere with P . In (Kooi & Tamminga, 2013),
it was shown that these LP and S5 models are TrLP-equivalent.
Based on this observation, if Heloise has a winning strategy for ΓS5(M,ϕ)
at all points in M , it means that, by the aforementioned translation, ϕ has
a truth value T in LP. Then by Theorem 3.3, Heloise has a winning strategy
in ΓLP(M ′, ϕ). Similarly, if Abelard has a winning strategy for ΓS5(M,ϕ) at
all points in M , it means that, by the aforementioned translation, ϕ has a
truth value F in LP. Then by Theorem 3.3, Abelard has a winning strategy
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in ΓLP(M ′, ϕ). Finally, if Astrolabe has a winning strategy for ΓS5(M,ϕ) at
some points in M , it means that, by the aforementioned translation, ϕ has a
truth value P in LP. Then by Theorem 3.3, Astrolabe has a winning strategy in
ΓLP(M
′, ϕ). 
The translation between LP and S5 via game semantics brings along the
question of apply the same methodology to a (possible) translation between BL
and a modal logic. We leave this to future work.
9 Difficult Logics
There are some well-known and well-studied paraconsistent logics in the liter-
ature which have not been discussed in this work. Let us now explain why the
well-known Brazilian and Canadian schools of paraconsistency do not seem to
fit in our Hintikkan approach.
The da Costa system is one of the most well-known and well-studied systems
of paraconsistent logic (da Costa, 1974; da Costa et al., 2007). In order to
control inconsistencies, da Costa systems introduce a weaker negation alongside
a consistency operator ◦. This operator brings the meta-logical condition of
consistency down to the object level. In this syntax, ◦ϕ reads that the formula
ϕ is consistent. Moreover, the classical negation can also be reclaimed in the da
Costa systems.
From a game theoretical perspective, the rather ad hoc consistency opera-
tor seems unusual as it does not seem to have an immediate game theoretical
counterpart, to the best of our knowledge. There have been attempts to give
Kripkean possible world semantics and topological semantics for da Costa log-
ics, yet such works simply take this operator as a given function (Baaz, 1986;
Bas¸kent, 2016). Similarly, the Logic of Formal Inconsistency (LFI, for short) ex-
tends da Costa systems and seems to suffer from similar game theoretical issues
(Carnielli et al., 2007).
Game theoretical problems for da Costa logics are rooted in the fact that
players in our approach cannot test the consistency of the formulas when they
are making moves. This would require an (omniscient and omnipotent) auxil-
iary player whose task is to check the consistency of the formulas. Since such a
player cannot be associated with truth values, we chose not to implement this
idea in this work. Moreover, the game theoretical connection between the con-
sistency of a formula and the winning strategies is not clear, as the logics we
have discussed have demonstrated. Therefore, admitting a consistency-forcer
player seems difficult, if not impossible in our Hintikkan approach.
The Canadian school of paraconsistency, which is widely known as Preserva-
tionism and pioneered by Jennings and Schotch, also falls outside the scope of
the current paper. In Jennings and Schotch’s work, modal truth conditions are
extended from a binary accessibility relation to an n-ary accessibility relation R.
In this way, their system preserves the rule of necessitation and the monotonicity
principle of modal logic (Schotch et al., 2009). The semantics for the necessity
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modality is given as follows for a possible world w.
w |= ϕ if and only if ∀v1, . . . , vn(Rwv1 . . . vn → ∃i ≤ n.vi |= ϕ)
In this case it is not difficult to see how some possible worlds can satisfy the
modal contradictions in the form of (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ). Additionally, one of the techni-
cal strengths of the preservationist account is its interdependence with various
algebraic and lattice theoretical notions.
The above definition introduces an additional layer of complexity for game
theoretical semantics for preservationist logics. In the classical, binary modal
case, the accessibility relation dictates how the game proceeds in a deterministic
fashion. For boxed-formulas, Abelard the falsifier chooses whichever accessible
state he wishes, and for diamond-formulas Heloise the verifier chooses one of
the accessible states. However, in preservationism, for boxed-formulas Abelard
the falsifier must first choose a string of accessible states (that is a vector of the
form v1 . . . vn) among many possibilities. This choice implicitly includes another
choice, which is represented by the existential quantifier in the consequent to
determine the precise point in the vector which satisfies the formula. This would
amount to two choices disguised in one move. Yet another complication is that
such a move involves formula dependency, and the game rules must reflect this
fact. For this reason, we have not considered preservationist paraconsistent sys-
tems in this work, even if they seem to provide a rich mathematical machinery
and interesting applications, especially for IF-logic or dependency logic (Mann
et al., 2011; Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2007).
10 Conclusion
In this work, we discussed how different non-classical logics require different
verification games. We observed that some logics require additional players,
some require concurrent play and some require coalitions. Most importantly,
paraconsistent logics break the immediate connection between truth values and
winning strategies. In addition to that, in some games, the knowledge of the
existence of winning strategies for the opponents may be required to determine
the truth value of the formula. This directly relates the discussion to epistemic
game theory in a way that was not addressed by IF-logic. Furthermore, we
observed that for some logics, admitting winning strategies do not conclusively
say anything about the truth value of the formula in question.
Additionally, the current work can be seen as an attempt to broaden the
semantical basis of non-classical logic. A vast majority of work on the subject
presents an axiomatic, proof-theoretical approach, and the semantical analysis
of the subject is usually found trapped between truth-tables and algebraic se-
mantics. Game theoretical semantics, on the other hand, has the potential to
position itself within the intersection of both research programs. It introduces
non-classical logics more systematically to the Hintikkan agenda of game theo-
retical semantics, and at the same time, encourages further applications of the
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Hintikkan approach in non-classical logical domains - which, for various philo-
sophical reasons, remained not-so-influential for non-classical logicians.
Game theory is the study of rational, interactive decision making. In this
work, we studied the interactive decisions in logic and games, and did not dis-
cuss the rationality of the players, apart from their hidden assumption to choose
the best moves to win the play of the game. Potential future work in this area
is to relate non-classical logical games to (ir-)rationality. In this framework, it
is meaningful to ask how players’ rationality changes from one logic to the an-
other, and how the rationality of players can be defined for inconsistent logics
and their verification games.
Our choice of logics can be seen as limited. This is most certainly true.
Within the reasonable limits of a research article, we considered few proposi-
tional logics, one from each family, and discussed their game theoretical seman-
tics. Each family of non-classical logics contains a wide variety of logical systems
with some modal and first-order extensions. For practical reasons, we limited
ourselves to well-known, relatively well-studied propositional non-classical log-
ics. This should serve as an indication to show the breadth and depth of this
research project and its future potential. Therefore, we leave the extension of
this approach to modal and first-order non-classical logics to future work.
Our approach here can be seen as a case for the plurality of logic (Beall
& Restall, 2006). The well-known classical GTS is essentially a very narrow,
limited case with many additional and auxiliary game theoretical and logical
assumptions and restrictions. Once those assumptions are set aside (or at least
questioned) for various reasons, GTS turns out to be expressive enough for a
variety of non-classical logics as we have exemplified.
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